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This paper is qualitative and theoretical research of the concept of freedom, perceived through different 
epistemological traditions. The research focus is laid on the phenomenon of freedom in the frames of liberal 
ontological and epistemological tradition
individual liberty remains a precondition for evolving freedom. The beginning is characterized as a 
comparison between the different freedom traditions, starting with collective freedom tradi
individualist freedom traditions and finalizing with operationalization of individual liberty. The process of 
operationalization of liberty, or presenting it as an organizational and regulation principle, leads to 
demystification of freedom in individualistic traditions, and indicates its tight connection with individual 
liberty. 
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This paper is qualitative and theoretical research of the concept of freedom, 
perceived through different epistemological traditions. The research focus is laid on the 
phenomenon of freedom in the frames of liberal ontological and epistemological tradition
freedom as a derivative of the individual liberty, and how the individual liberty remains a 
precondition for evolving freedom. The beginning is characterized as a comparison 
between the different freedom traditions, starting with collective freedom tradi
following individualist freedom traditions and finalizing with operationalization of 
individual liberty. The process of operationalization of liberty, or presenting it as an 
organizational and regulation principle, leads to demystification of freedo
individualistic traditions, and indicates its tight connection with individual liberty. 
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 The problem of defining freedom in a liberal sense is common. This paper 
addresses the division line between the phenomena of individual liberty and freedom in 
liberal sense, and the relation established as a result of their connection 
 
DEFINING FREEDOM NEUTRALLY
A lot of definitions and interpretations of the essence of freedom could be found. 
The oldest sign symbolizing the freedom (or the liberty) is the Sumerian 
(see: Image 1), which represents a situation where the prisoner is liberated by saying
phrase - meaning “go to your mother” 
 
Image 1: Ama-gi written in classical
Lexicon: A Dictionary Guide to the Ancient Sumerian Language
The phenomenon of f
determined by the ideological and epistemological tradition. The most basic and common 
meaning of freedom, isolated from the ideological influences throughout the history could 
be represented as: “the power to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or 
restraint” (Oxford dictionaries
following the individual’s 
three crucial elements, which the phenomenon freedom is based on: 
absence of obstacles. Accordingly, the freedom remains a power (utilizing a right) to 
an action, presented as acting, speaking, thinking. 
Beside the neutral definition of freedom as a phenomenon, a lot of schools, 
ideological and epistemological traditions are defining it according to their 
understandings, as a part of the ideological or epistemological framework.
common traditions are: collectivism
The both traditions are defining and understanding the phenomenon of freedom in 
a different way when it comes to the 
collective as a sum of individuals, or a 
subject bearer of the freedom. The second tradition emphasizes that only the individual 
could be the subject bearer of the freedom.
As mentioned above, the collective freedom traditions attach the phenomenon of 
freedom to the collective unit
single units cannot be the subject bearer of the freedom, but they could be part
subject through participation in the 
and sum of individuals is that the first is centralized and hierarchical body, while the second 
is decentralized in a sense that the individuals as single 
collective exercise of freedom. The most significant traditions of collective freedom are: 
 
-
 
- as a symbol of freedom and/or liberty
 
 
 Sumerian cuneiform (Source: Halloran John Alan. 2006. 
, David Brown Book Company
 
reedom is related to various meanings and interpretations, 
 2016). In that sense, the freedom remains a 
will, without obstacles. According to the statement, there are 
 
 
FREEDOM TRADITIONS 
 
 and individualism. 
subject bearer of the freedom. In the first tradition, the 
unit contained of individuals (Laszlo 1963, 6) is the 
 
, or/and the sum of individuals. In that sense, the individuals as 
unit or the sum. The difference between 
units could participate in the 
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1. nationalism,  
2. socialism and  
3. democratic tradition. 
 
The nationalism as an ideology and political theory and particularly its main 
proponents are creating and utilizing the quasi-scientific concept of national freedom. In 
their perspective, the subject bearer of the national freedom is the nation. In that sense, the 
category of freedom is connected with its subject bearer - the nation - which represents a 
collective unit, composed of individuals with a specific homogeneous part of their identity, 
such as language, religion, and common collective memory. It is supposed, that collective 
needs could be satisfied through nation’s preferences. The nation could be located as a 
source of the political power, and it presents a collective, undivided unit, broader than the 
individuals living on the state’s territory (Shkarik & Siljanovska 2009, VII Ch.).  
On the contrary, the nation could be defined as an imagined political community, 
which represents the sovereign (Anderson 1998, 19).  The national freedom remains a 
political category, materialized in the process of state-building, where the individuals could 
exercise freedom as a part of the national freedom. Operationalized, the national freedom 
represents a politico-organizational principle for nation-state building as a political praxis. 
The national freedom and the individual liberty with their connection to the individual 
freedom are not corresponding mutually, and the first could be potential threat to the 
second and the third. 
The second ideology - scientifically based - is socialism, or narrowly Marxism, 
which perceives the freedom as emancipatory (material) freedom. Marxists are developing 
the idea of emancipatory freedom as the opposite idea of a metaphysical freedom, which is 
often identified with the liberal or individualistic notion of freedom. From Marxist 
standpoint, “Freedom is the right and capacity of people to determine their own actions, in 
a community which is able to provide for the full development of human potentiality 
(Encyclopedia of Marxism) (“the right of bread prior then the freedom”). Freedom may be 
enjoyed by individuals but only in and through community.” Accordingly, the phenomenon 
of freedom is determined by the social context or the community. In that sense, the freedom 
is not an independent phenomenon, and its fulfillment depends on the community, or the 
social context which is identified with a community that is able to provide for the full 
development of human potentiality. In the political praxis of Marxism or the real socialism 
achieved in USSR and Eastern Europe, practically the concepts of national freedom and 
material freedom are implemented almost as synonyms. Although conceptually, there are 
differences between the both: the nation positioned itself as a subject barrier of the 
freedom, decorated with Marxist ornaments. The most common, most adopted, and most 
preferential tradition within the collective freedom traditions is the democratic tradition. 
The democratic tradition, influenced also of individualistic freedom traditions, recognizes 
individual liberty (negative freedom), and political (positive) freedom, corresponding with 
Berlin’s freedom approach (Berlin 2000, 50). The negative freedom and the positive 
freedom are not representing a different vision of the freedom in general, but two different 
ways of defining and conceptualizing the general meaning of freedom. The positive 
freedom identifies the right of the individual as a part of the sum of individuals (Rousseau 
1978, 22), often represented through the nation, to participate in the process of policy 
making, as a subject of the political power. 
30 
 
Individualistic freedom traditions 
 
The third ideology with the biggest impact of today’s international political reality 
- liberalism (in its broadest sense) - develops its own freedom perspective, based on the 
individual liberty that is positioned at the top of its axiological pyramid. The starting point 
for demystification of the freedom, in the sense of classical liberalism, contemporary 
libertarianism, and individualist/market anarchism, is dealing with the phenomenon of 
individual liberty. Due to these tendencies, the individual liberty appears as: 
1. the highest value in the liberal axiological pyramid,  
2. the main concept in the liberal theory, 
3. the basic organizational principle in a society, 
4. the basic regulation principle in a society. 
 
All of these meanings or interpretations of individual liberty are narrowly 
connected with a certain branch of the social science. The individual liberty - perceived as 
a value - is a subject of philosophy, particularly ethics. Perceived as a concept, it remains in 
the interest of political science within political theories. The interpretation of liberty as a 
principle varies from the branch standpoint; the political science, or particularly public 
policy researching, lays an accent on liberty as an (political) organizational principle, while 
the interpretation of liberty as regulation principle in society could be of interest within 
sociology and law. 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING LIBERTY 
 
The first meaning of the individual liberty as a value remains in the frames of the 
ethics, as specific part of the philosophy. The individual liberty is positioned as the highest 
value in the liberal ethics. Appearing as a value, it is based on two common justifications. 
The first justification of individual liberty in the scope of the liberal axiological tradition is 
the moral (Palmer 2015, 31), philosophical or metaphysical justification. According to it, 
the individual liberty appears solely as a goal in the liberal theory, independently from 
other social values such as order, social justice, material equality (egalitarianism) etc. This 
justification is close to the standpoint of the objectivism as 20th century philosophical 
school in the scope of the broadest contemporary libertarianism. The second justification is 
the utilitarian, economic justification (Palmer 2015, 31) of individual liberty, which could 
be located in the statement that materializing the idea of individual liberty and developing 
free society could enhance the process of fulfilling other social goals represented as social 
values. In that sense, through developing a free society, where the individual liberty got its 
absolute form, other goals such as social justice, order, equality etc. could be achieved. 
Most of the liberal schools adopt this justification, such as classical liberalism in its 
original context, individualist anarchist tradition, and contemporary libertarianism. 
The second meaning, or individual liberty as a concept, has an ontological, 
philosophical nature. The basic and most common definition of individual liberty is the 
following: “absence of interpersonal violence, the use of initiated force or violence, or its 
threat against the person or property of another” (Osterfeld 1986, 239). In that sense, the 
individual liberty emerges as a state of non-violence or threat with violence, as an antonym 
of violence or threat with violence (the violence and/or threat with violence could be 
submerged into the category of coercion) (Rothbard 2009, 11).  
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Following, the individual liberty is solely determined by the coercion. The people 
are fully enjoying absolute individual liberty when there is absence of coercion in the 
regulation of their relation with other individuals and with themselves - principle of self-
ownership (Rothbard 2002, 28). This method of establishing and regulating interpersonal 
(social) relations is conceptualized in the principle of non-aggression, which is the 
foundation of the liberal thought. The alternative regulation method of coercion is the 
regulation method of consent or contractual method, which is non-coercive (Palmer 2009, 
126). This method for developing interpersonal (social) relations could be operationalized 
as expressing consent for each interpersonal (social) relation that affects the individuals in 
the relation and out of the relation. The consent or contractual method is conceptualized in 
the principle of voluntarism. 
 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF LIBERTY 
 
Operationalized individual liberty covers two meanings: liberty as an 
organizational principle, and liberty as a regulation principle. Liberty as an organizational 
principle is linked to the politics, where the individual liberty appears as a primal 
organizational principle the public policy is based on; and a regulation principle for the 
interpersonal (social) relations in the concrete society. The first two meanings are more or 
less abstract meanings of the liberty. However, when liberty is perceived as an 
organizational and regulation principle of a society, there is a need of specifying it, and the 
political and social reality effects it produces.  
 
Liberty as an organizational principle 
 
The projection of the individual liberty as an organizational principle could 
emanate from the most common definition of it and its constitutive elements. The 
individual liberty remains an absence of violence and/or threat with violence. Deriving 
from the axiom, the relation between the individual liberty and the violence is a zero-sum 
game. Since violence is the determining the liberty, and their relation as a zero-sum game, it 
could be concluded that their relation is conversely proportional. The sum of individual 
liberty has an increasing tendency by lowering the sum of violence from the social 
(interpersonal) relations, and conversely. The violence and the threat with violence have 
two forms in a society. The first emerges as decentralized, non-organized, non-legitimate 
violence, while the second as centralized, organized, and legitimate violence (Rothbard 
2009, 11). The decentralized violence could be exercised by private agents, while the 
organized one is performed by the state.  
In the focus of interest of this paper is the political understanding of individual 
liberty as an antonym of the organized violence, manifested in the State (Oppenheimer 
1926, 24-25). The State could be defined as a “human community which successfully 
claims monopoly on legitimate use of physical coercion on certain territory.” (Fukuyama 
2012, 24). It could be also defined as “a group of persons who have and exercise supreme 
authority within a given territory or over certain population.” (McLaughlin 2007, 74). In 
that sense, the state could be manifested as a certain group of people that are subject barrier 
of political power (Mann 2006, 9), condign power (Galbraith 1995, 4-5), or the power to 
use and/or threat with violence, expressed on a certain territory (Krasner 1999, 47). In 
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addition,” the state is sovereign, or the supreme power within its territory, and by definition 
the ultimate authority for all laws, i.e. binding rules supported by coercive sanctions” 
(Dosenrode 2007, 19). The violence is the main method the state is based on. 
 The potential political reality, appearing as a consequence of a full adoption of the 
principle of individual liberty is the establishment of free society (Butler 25, 2013). 
Depending of the individualistic liberty tradition, the phenomenon of free society could be 
perceived as a state of anarchy in the epistemic tradition of individualistic anarchism. 
According to it, there is no justification of a State as a violator of the individual actions 
(Rothbard 2009, 11). Anarchy remains a state of no political authority (McLaughlin 2007, 
27) as a legitimate monopoly of practicing physical force. The phenomenon of free society 
that could be also perceived as a state of presence of minimal (public) government appeared 
in the Minimal (Night-watchman) state (Nozick 1974, 26) as a bearer of political authority. 
The classical liberalism and contemporary libertarianism adopt a justification solely for 
minimal State. The minimal (night-watchman) state stands for the state that is significantly 
limited, and its function is associated with protection of individual life, liberty, and 
property (Locke, 2006) of non-organized violence. The other spheres of social 
(interpersonal) relations remain unregulated from the state, but instead, they are objects of 
non-coercive regulation (Rothbard 2009, 913).  
The individual liberty in its absolute form - in political sense - is organizationally 
operationalized in a condition of anarchy, or in a condition where the state still exists, but 
with a small capacity to get involved in the individual actions, represented in the form of a 
Night-watchman state. Projected, the individual liberty within this libertarian position could 
be identified as an individual space for individual action. Basically, it represents a neutral 
space that each individual possesses, which could be active within it, without any 
restriction from some political center. If the position is neutral and remains out of the 
domain of coercion, it could be concluded that the individual spaces of each individual 
remains equal in a quantitative sense. So, the individual liberty - represented as an 
individual neutral space of a certain individual - is equal to other individuals’ liberties. 
Finally, if the individual liberties that each individual possess are equal in a free society, 
then the liberty achieved its absolute form. The absolute form of liberty in this sense is not 
a synonym with the natural liberty in Hobbes’s (Hobbes 2010, 106) and Locke’s sense, but 
it is a derivative from them, compromised by the individual life as a main value based on 
liberty (Locke, 2006). Accordingly, the all individual liberties are mutually bound (Ilievski 
2015, 12), leavening an equal amount of neutral individual space. 
 
 
Table 1: Operationalized liberty as an organizational principle 
 
Method Principle Actor Authority Type of socio-political 
organization 
Coercive Physical force The State Political The State 
Non-
coercive 
Individual 
space Individuals 
No political 
authority 
Anarchy/ 
Night-watchman state 
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Liberty as a regulation principle 
 
Regulation in its most basic sense stands for “principle or rule (with or without the 
coercive power of law) employed in controlling, directing, or managing an activity, 
organization” (Business Dictionary). In that sense, the regulation stretches the process of 
making and the sum of rules and norms, which are conducting human behavior and 
interpersonal (social) relations. The process of regulation plays a huge role in the 
establishment of an order as a preferential social value and goal. The crucial point of 
division relates the method of maintaining and exercising the norms, which can be coercive 
or non-coercive, and according to the division, the regulation could be coercive or non-
coercive. Analyzed through the prism of voluntarism, the regulation could be with an 
individual consent - for the relations each individual evolves - or non-consensual, where the 
individual does not express its consent and the regulation is maintained coercively. The 
coercive method of regulating human behavior covers the existence of the state, as a social 
regulator with its legitimate monopoly of physical force. The state appears as a subject 
bearer, decision-making center, and executer of the regulation, and correspondingly, a 
creator of an order. The coercive regulation originates from the political authority 
(McLaughlin 2007, 69) signified in the political center of decision-making, which is 
practicing the regulation following top-down approach. In this case, the objects of the 
regulation are the individuals and their relation. As a consequence of the coercive or 
centralized regulation, the coercive or conscious order (Bamyeh 2009, 28) appears. 
In the opposite case (the case of potential non-coercive order), individual liberty - 
along its understandings as value, concept, and organizational principle - could appear as a 
regulation principle, an alternative for the coercive regulation, and a basic principle for 
non-coercive regulation. In that sense, the individual liberty remains an individual space for 
individual action. An individual action is represented in the individual preference and the 
individual will. The individual actions possess capacity of networking each other by 
following the human interactions. The order that could appear from a potential network of 
individual preferences, manifested in the inter-networked individual actions, appears in the 
literature under various names, such as spontaneous order (Proudhon, 1863), voluntary 
order, unimposed order (Bamyeh 2009, 28), polycentric order (Hayek 2011, 230), social 
order (Elias 2001, 40) or natural order (Hoppe 2007, 71). The spontaneous order could be 
defined as:  
Significant and positive coordinating force – in which decentralized 
negotiations, exchanges, and entrepreneurship converge to produce large-
scale coordination without, or beyond the capacity of, any deliberate plans 
or explicit common blueprints for social or economic development (Chartier 
& Charles 2011, 2). 
 
The connection of the individual actions constitutes individual rights and duties in 
a form of consensual act - contract (Rothbard 2009, 91) in a form of practical authority 
(Bamyeh 2009, 27) as their source. The absolute freedom is relativized with the 
constituting of the act and the practical authority as its essence, in accordance with the 
individual’s preference, manifested in a given-consent. The process of self-relativization of 
freedom positions itself as the essence of the spontaneous order, in a bottom-up order. 
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Table 2: Operationalized liberty as a regulation principle 
 
Method Principle Actor Objects Authority 
Goal/ 
Conseque
nce 
Type 
of 
regul
ation 
Coercive Non 
consensual 
Political 
center 
Individuals 
and their 
relations 
Political Coercive 
order 
 
Ce
n
tr
al
iz
ed
 
 
Non-
coercive 
Individual 
action Individuals 
Individuals 
and their 
relations 
Practical Spontaneous 
order 
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
ed
 
 
 
 
THE FREEDOM AS A FRUIT OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY 
 
As explained beyond, the operationalized individual liberty could appear as an 
organizational principle, an essence of political reality, and individual liberty, as a 
regulation principle, an essence of social reality. Operationalized individual liberty could be 
defined as individual space for individual action, where the individual space covers the 
neutral space of the individual, characterized by exclusion of coercion, and the individual 
action symbolizes the individual preference, articulated in the neutral space. The individual 
space appears as a guarantee for the individual action, and without any individual action 
taken, it is an empty space. Each individual has an equal neutral space for actualizing its 
preference under these conditions. Once liberty operationalized, the question that arises is 
whether the freedom could find its place within this operationalization, in the 
individualistic freedom tradition in general.  
The basic and neutral definition of freedom that the paper started with is “the 
power to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint.” In accordance to 
this neutral definition of the freedom in most general sense, it could be stated that it 
corresponds with the second part of the operationalized liberty. It refers to the individual 
action that takes place within the individual space. The first part of the definition - “the 
power to act, speak or think” - refers to the individual action. The second part of the 
definition - “as one wants without hindrance or restraint” - refers to the individual space, 
which remains a non-coercion guarantee for the action, or the power to act, speak, or think. 
In this case, the individual liberty could be analyzed as an individual space, while 
the freedom as an individual action. The individual space and the individual action 
complement each other. The individual space covers no coercive interference, while the 
individual action allows consensual interference. The individual space remains a neutral 
space that is not connected with individual preferences which are also crucial to the 
individual action. The individual action is a subjective category determined by the 
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individual preference, while the individual space is an objective category that is socially 
and politically recognized and legitimate. The individual spaces are equal in their 
quantitative dimension, while each action could not be equal with another action. In that 
sense, the individual space could be identified as a base for the action, while the action 
could appear as a superstructure based on the space. The individual space is politically 
established as a political organizational principle, while the individual action is socially 
established as a result of the space and the human interaction. The action deriving from its 
unequal nature varies, while the individual space preserves its constant and equal nature. 
Finally, the individual space covers a passive principle with constant nature, while the 
individual action is determined by each individual.  
As a conclusion, it could be stated that the freedom is a fruit of liberty, therefore 
the liberty guarantees the space where the freedom potentially arises from, and accordingly, 
the first determinates the second. The individual liberty could be defined as the individual 
space for an individual action, which lays an accent on the individual space. The freedom 
could be defined as the power to act, speak, or think as one wants without coercive 
hindrance or restraint, and to pay more attention of the power to act, speak, and think, or 
synthesized in an individual action. The space is a precondition for action, while the action 
is the sense and the meaning of the space. 
 
. 
CONCLUSION 
 
It could be concluded that the operationalization of liberty leads to demystification 
of the freedom in the frames of liberal epistemology. Firstly, the phenomenon of freedom is 
defined in a neutral, etymological way. Two basic freedom traditions are exposed: the 
collective freedom tradition and the individualistic freedom tradition. The essential 
difference between the both is the difference around the subject bearer of freedom, which 
could be a collective unit, sum of individuals, or an individual. In the scope of the 
individualistic freedom tradition, conceptualization and operationalization takes place. The 
conceptualization of liberty stretches the individual liberty understood as value 
(philosophical standpoint) and as concept (political science and political philosophy 
standpoint). The operationalization of liberty covers the two meanings of individual liberty 
as an organizational principle and as a regulation principle.  
Namely, it could be stated that the freedom is a fruit of liberty, therefore the liberty 
guarantees the space where the freedom potentially arises from, and accordingly, the first 
determinates the second. The division line is the following: 
1. The individual liberty could be defined as the individual space for individual action, 
which lays an accent on the individual space; 
2. The freedom could be defined as the power to act, speak, or think as one wants 
without coercive hindrance or restraint, and to pay more attention to the power to 
act, speak, think, or synthetized in individual action. 
3. The space is a precondition for action, while the action is the sense and the meaning 
of the space. 
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